Colombia
Ecuador
Peru
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Solving
the Access
Problem
By Francisco Prior Sanz

T

he level of financial deepening in Latin America is either
low or very low, depending
on the country and the indicator
used. In the cases of Colombia,
Ecuador, and Peru, the percentage
of the population without access to
basic financial services is 55 percent
in Colombia, 66 percent in Ecuador,
and 65 percent in Peru.1 In contrast,
in the developed countries of Spain
and the United States only 2 percent
and 10 percent, respectively, of the
population over eighteen years of
age lack access to financial services.2
Nevertheless, in regional terms,
Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru have
medium levels of access to financial services; these levels are higher
than those in Mexico and Central
America (Honduras, Guatemala,

El Salvador) but lower than those
of Brazil and Chile.
Macroeconomic indicators of
financial deepening show similar
statistics among those of the population with no access to financial
services. In 2003, the percentage
of credit to the private sector with
respect to gross domestic product
was 23.4 percent, 19.9 percent, and
20.8 percent for Colombia, Ecuador,
and Peru, respectively. Although
these figures are average in Latin
America, they are very much below
the average of developed countries.
In our research, we analyzed the
problem of low access to financial services in Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru,
and we propose technical solutions
to address the causes of this problem.
These solutions, which are already in

use by some financial institutions
in developing countries, allow banks
to profitably service low income
segments of the population.
The research in these three
Andean countries shows that leading
microfinance institutions in these
countries have been able to solve this
supply problem. The best practices
observed are based on the development of financial service distribution business models that are highly
efficient. These models combine
products, distribution networks, and
risk methodologies that allow the
profitable servicing of low income
population segments.
Causes of Low Access
The analysis of the elements in the
supply of financial services explains
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Table 1: Financial Deepening in Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru—Regional and Global Comparisons
Private sector
credit/GDP

Liquid liabilities/GDP

Capital markets/GDP

(%)GDP

1990

2003

1990

2003

1990

2003

Colombia

30.8

23.4

29.8

32

3.5

18.1

Ecuador

13.6

19.9

21.1

21.7

0.6

7.9

Peru

11.8

20.8

24.8

29.8

3.1

26.5

Venezuela

25.4

8.6

38.8

22.3

17.2

4.5

Mexico

17.5

18.5

22.4

29.1

12.4

19.6

Brazil

38.9

34.6

26.4

30

3.6

47.6

Chile

47.2

63.3

40.8

38.2

44.9

119.2

125.8

158.3

92.8

104.3

51.6

100.1
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64.2

42.2

81.4

19.4

44.5

39.3

58.6

41.1

76.9

18.8

43.5

22.3

27

36.2

51.9

10.5

37.3

Developed
countries
average
Average income
Low-middle
income
Low income

Source: World Development Indicators 2003

the inefficiency and inadequacy of
the distribution models in Colombia,
Ecuador, and Peru. This section
looks at five elements that set the
context for the financial system: (1)
the cost levels of basic financial services, (2) the density of the financial
service distribution networks, (3)
risk analysis methodologies, (4)
database analysis systems, and (5)
the regulatory context.
In these countries, the prices of
interest rates, minimum balances,
maintenance fees and commissions
for cash transfers, and withdrawals are
very high compared to those of more
developed countries. The high prices
in Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru are
caused not only by the low efficiency
rates for the financial institutions but
also by the high concentration in these
countries’ financial sectors.
Financial service distribution networks are not dense enough in most
of Latin America because traditional
banking networks are too expensive if
they are to serve low income clients.
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As of 2004, there were only 8.7 bank
branches per every 100,000 people
in Colombia, 9.3 in Ecuador, and 4.2
in Peru.
Credit risk analysis methodologies in the Andean countries, and
Latin America in general, are not
well adapted to their economic realities; in particular, they neglect the
importance of their large informal
economies. Current methodologies
use stable and proven cash flows
(e.g., wage income), excluding
income from the informal economy
as a determinant of credit worthiness. Moreover, banks concentrate on
offering credit to current members by
placing a greater weight on variables
that tie the client to the institution.
Nevertheless, these methodologies
rarely include sociodemographic
variables that would generate more
accurate client profiles and determine
credit worthiness faster and cheaper.
There are also problems related
to the legal acceptance or recognition of certain kinds of collateral, as

well as the information received by
credit grantors, which comes almost
exclusively from financial institutions.
By not including the payment history with commercial establishments
of outside customers in their credit
profile, banks are in fact being overly
restrictive by denying them access to
the formal financial system.
From a regulatory perspective,
the normative context creates additional barriers to financial services
access. In the three countries analyzed, there are different regulatory
realities that have different ways of
impacting the already inefficient cost
structures of financial institutions.
Financial institutions in Ecuador and
Peru, however, enjoy a more favorable
and adequate regulatory context to
promote access to financial services
than in Colombia.
While there are no controls
over the interest rate in Ecuador and
Peru because service fees are liberalized, the interest rate in Colombia is
limited by the usury rate. Colombia

research

also taxes financial transactions and
forces investments in unprofitable
activities, which add costs to financial
institutions and, in turn, are reflected
in higher prices to Colombian clients
for financial services.
In terms of credit portfolio
provisions, current legislation penalizes the generation of microcredit
loans in the three countries studied. Their regulatory systems force
financial institutions to provide this
portfolio more restrictively than the
other credit portfolios even though
delinquency rates are not particularly higher. In the Colombian and
Peruvian cases, the definition of the
system of guarantees does not fit the
economic reality in these countries,
further complicating credit granting
to the population that operates in the
informal economy.
In terms of control and requirements of the distribution network,
the Ecuadorian and Peruvian systems
are more flexible than the Colombian
system. Because of their regulatory
flexibility, auxiliary financial service

networks were created in Ecuador,
and teller representatives were
implemented in Peru. These solutions
partially solve the problem of lack of
access to banking agencies. Although
Colombian legislation is traditionally more strict in this regard, it has

Despite the economic growth in the
past years, the population living in
poverty has not decreased noticeably.
recently become more flexible with
the passing of the law of nonbanking
representatives, which aims to add
bank branches in the country. Finally,
because of illegal activities related to
drug trafficking, regulation on international transfers, and information
requirements on the owners of banking products, it is difficult to access
financial services in general. These
requirements do not exist in either
Ecuador or Peru, indicating a less
strict environment in these countries.

Table 2: Main Countries in Latin America That Received
Workers Remittances in 2005
2005

Millions US$

%GDP

20,034

2.80%

Brazil

6,411

1.10%

Colombia

4,126

4.10%

Guatemala

2,993

9.30%

El Salvador

2,830

17.10%

Dominican Republic

2,682

9.10%

Peru

2,495

3.20%

Ecuador

2,005

6.40%

Honduras

1,763

21.20%

Jamaica

1,651

19%

Mexico

Source: The Multilateral Investment Fund, http://www.iadb.org/mif, 2006

Nevertheless, in terms of public
policy, the Colombian government
has pushed a new initiative called
Bank of Opportunities—or Banca
de las Oportunidades—that would
allow microfinance institutions to
generate economies of scale. Enabling
the achievement of or access to scale
economies is necessary to apply best
practices in banking and to optimize
migrant remittances because these
require infrastructures too expensive to be developed individually by
most microfinance organizations.
There are no policies in Ecuador
or Peru that address this problem
from the supply side; in these
countries, the only initiative is
to create central associations of
cooperatives (FINANCOOP in
Ecuador and FENACREP in
Peru) that seek to create synergies and scale economies. The
Bank of Opportunities initiative
in Colombia also aims to reduce
the above mentioned regulatory
obstacles, allowing the possibility to resolve these restrictions in
short or medium terms.
Economic and Financial
Structures
The macroeconomic context in
the three Andean countries has
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been favorable in recent years. Even
after passing through severe economic
and financial crises at the end of the
1990s, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru
have all retaken the growth path
within a stable macroeconomic situation in terms of inflation, exchange
rate, and interest rate. Despite the
economic growth in the past years,
the population living in poverty has
not decreased noticeably. Poverty is
one of the structural problems common to the three countries and the
whole region.
The 1998 banking and financial crises in Colombia and Peru,
and in Ecuador in 1999, forced the
countries’ governments to intervene
to rescue their insolvent banking
systems. As of December 2005, the
rescue packages had increased public
debt levels to 46.8 percent of GDP in
Colombia, 40.1 percent of GDP in
Ecuador, and 39.7 percent of GDP in
Peru.3 The importance of public debt
as a percentage of GDP is another
common characteristic in Latin
America; this debt generates a steady
flow of income to the financial system
and does not foster lending to the
private sector.

Public debt in Colombia,
Ecuador, and Peru shifts the liquidity in the banking system away from
the private sector. Servicing the
public sector has fewer operational
costs and produces higher returns on
assets to institutions with inefficient
cost structures. This explains why
financing in the private sector is
concentrated on large corporations,
leaving out small enterprises and
individual clients.  
The financial institution
industry in these countries obtains
financing from considerable levels
of unremunerated deposits. These
deposits mainly finance public and
corporate credit, yielding high profits
and low delinquency rates without
having to invest in the infrastructure
to bank the rest of the population
in the country. The Ecuadorian case
shows the striking characteristic of
a decreasing delinquency rate even
though it is still above the Latin
American average, in part due to
the persistent effects of the 1999
banking crisis.
Along with the inefficiency of
their financial service distribution
business models, the macroeconomic

structures in Latin American countries explain why financial institutions have not directed their supply
of services to low income segments.
The scarcity of microfinance services
in a context of increasing demand
favored the emergence of specialized
institutions that serve the financial
needs of the low income segments.
The increasing demand for their services and the implementation of best
practices made it possible for these
institutions to obtain high profits and
reinvest their earnings to expand their
activities. This is the case of Banco
Caja Social in Colombia, Banco
Solidario in Ecuador, and Mibanco in
Peru, all leading banking institutions
in the microfinance sector.
Cooperative systems in the three
countries, traditionally more likely
to service low income segments, were
severely affected because of managerial inadequacy and failings during
the banking crises. The Colombian
case is particularly relevant since the
cooperative sector represented almost
10 percent of domestic savings before
the crisis, while today it retains only
marginal weight in the financial and
microfinance sector.

Table 3: Best Practices in Microfinance Business Models Found in Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru
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Best Practice

Ecuador

Peru

Colombia

Use of low cost financial
products

pichincha

banco de crédito/
mibanco

banco caja social

Commercialization through
alternative channels

pichincha

INTERBANK

BANCOLOMBIA

Development of efficient risk
analysis methodologies

BANCO SOLIDARIO

MIBANCO

BANCOLOMBIA

Optimization of the impact
of remittances

BANCO SOLIDARIo

BANcO DE CRéDITO

BANCOLOMBIA

Generation of economies
of scale

PICHINCHA

CAJAS

BANCA OPORTUNIDADES
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Institutions specialized in consumer financing, following business
models that were successful in Chile,
moved into the niches neglected by
banks in the three Andean countries.
These institutions can take deposits
and at the same time offer consumer

Ecuador, remittances added to US$2
billion, 6.4 percent of GDP, and in
Peru, the amount of remittances was
US$2.5 billion or 3.2 percent of GDP.
Migrant remittance flows are
significant in macroeconomic terms
not only for their importance to

levels of access to basic financial
services in these countries. The emergence of microfinance in Colombia,
Ecuador, and Peru is led by two types
of institutions: banks specialized in
microfinance and the leading banking
institutions in each country.

Financial institutions in this market segment
have been able to create sustainable and profitable
business models that serve the segments of the
population not served by traditional banks.
credit through electronic banking
products distributed by nonbanking networks, primarily retail stores
and shopping centers. Though not
yet very important, a few consumer
finance institutions have begun to
gain significant market shares in the
microcredit sectors in Colombia
(Finamerica, Compartir), Ecuador
(Unibanco, Centromundo), and Peru
(Financiera Cordillera).
Other factors have also driven
the entry of leading banking institutions in Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru
into the microfinance market. First,
the macroeconomic stabilization in
these countries has decreased the
financing needs of the public sector.
Second, the development of low-cost
banking technologies and techniques
has enabled the development of business models that profitably serve the
needs of the low income segments of
the population.
Received Remittances
Remittances from emigrant workers
received in Latin America reached
US$52.6 billion in 2005.4 Colombia
received US$4.126 billion in remittances, 4.1 percent of its GDP. In

Financial institutions in this marGDP but also as a source of foreign
ket segment have been able to create
exchange and, thus, for their impact
sustainable and profitable business
on the current account. Additionally,
models that serve the segments of the
remittances have a multiplier effect
population not served by traditional
in the receiving economies because
banks—with the introduction of
of potential growth opportunities in
hometown associations and industries, products specifically designed for this
such as tourism, transportation, trade, purpose (Banco Caja Social Colmena
in Colombia), the high efficiency of
telecommunications, and even the
electronic payment methods
money transfer industry itself.
(Mibanco in Peru), and best pracNevertheless, the potential
tices in credit risk analysis (Banco
impact of remittances on promoting access to financial services in
Solidario in Ecuador).
Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru is not
On the other hand, microfinance institutions still face great
optimized because only a negligible
hurdles in their effort to massively
percentage of remittances are received
provide basic financial services to
through a bank account. Moreover,
the unbanked segment of the popuremittance flows are not considered income on a credit application,
lation in the three Andean countries. Because they are small, these
leaving 35 percent of the income
institutions lack the investment
received by 20 percent of families
capacity required to implement the
in Colombia, 37 percent in Ecuador,
infrastructures needed to apply best
and 24 percent in Peru out of the
practices in terms of products, risk,
credit risk analysis.
alternative channels, and optimizaMicrofinance Service
tion of the impact of remittances.
Supply Models
The second type of institutions
Recently, the growth of the microfileading the microfinance markets
nance sector in Colombia, Ecuador,
in Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru
and Peru has started to address the
are the leading banking institutions.
supply problem relative to the low
Bancolombia (Colombia), Banco del
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Pichincha-Credife (Ecuador), and
Banco de Credito (Peru) are leading
banking institutions that have followed this path; their new priority is

mote the necessary scale for institutions specialized in microfinance
are needed to massively provide
financial services to the population.
The Colombian government moved
in this direction with its Bank of
Opportunities initiative, which aims
to apply international best practices
by creating a technical association of
financial services that could provide
these services to cooperative financial
or banking institutions whose small

Their new priority is to develop value
offers aimed at low income segments.
to develop value offers aimed at low
income segments through the implementation of new business models.
To optimize their existing
infrastructures in the distribution
of low-cost financial services, these
institutions have decided to use
downscaling strategies. This is the
case of Banco del Pichincha-Credife
(Ecuador), Bancolombia (Colombia),
and Banco de Crédito (Peru).
Banco del Pichincha-Credife and
Bancolombia are the most relevant
cases because of their use of best
practices in the generation of alternative models of financial services
distribution. Banco del PichinchaCredife, through its existing network
of bank branches, and Bancolombia,
through the development of alternative distribution channels, have been
able to create highly efficient business
models that make it possible to bring
financial services to a large portion of
the population in these countries.
Nonetheless, other experiences
that have yielded better results in
countries where there are highly
inclusive financial systems, such as
Spain, Germany, Canada, or France,
show that public policies that pro46
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size prevents them from individual
access to these technologies.
Neither Ecuador nor Peru has
come up with a policy similar to
Colombia’s initiative. Even though
Ecuador and Peru have more appropriate regulations to foster microfinance, there is no public policy to
promote economies of scale that
could solve the supply problems that
prevent access to financial services for
large segments of the population.
Conclusion
The main cause for the low levels of
access to financial services to low
income segments of the population
in Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru is
the inadequate supply of financial
services. This inadequate supply is
explained by the high cost of financial services, the commercialization
of services through costly and inadequately dense distribution networks,
and the use of risk methodologies
that are not adapted to the realities
of developing countries. Furthermore,
the regulatory frameworks observed
in these three countries, as in most
developing countries, do not favor
the development of efficient distribu-

tion models of microfinance services.
This work has shown that the
high price issue of financial services
can be addressed with the development and distribution of low cost
financial products. Also, the low
density of bank branches can be obviated with a strategy of commercialization that takes advantage of low cost,
alternative channels. The inadequacy
of the risk methodologies can be
resolved through the creation of new
analysis systems that include the
information from the vast informal
economies of developing countries.
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